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means remain: the global economy, foreign intervention, and
Islamic radicalisation
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Obama ‘s visit to the UK this week shows that there are many policy issues that his and
David Cameron’s administrations are in agreement on, despite their differing political
backgrounds. Nicholas Kitchen writes that while there are many similar priorities on both
sides, disagreements remain on how to reach these goals, especially in the areas of
foreign and economic policy.
As Barack Obama heads to the UK fresh from the bounce to his own ego and the US polls
that only the adoration of the Irish can provide, the President will find a British government
with similar foreign policy priorities and goals to his own. Yet at the same time, there are
real divisions surrounding the ways in which the two nations might about achieving them.
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This is not unusual. The ‘special relationship’ – or as the
two leaders themselves now cast it, the essential
relationship – has long been a political tripwire for both
governments, a neurosis for the British that shifts the
focus onto the trivialities of personal friendship to the
detriment of the substance of the Anglo-American
alliance. It is these long-established and embedded
substantive areas of cooperation at almost every level of
government and public policy – including systematic
intelligence sharing, diplomatic cooperation, shared
military structures and training – that marks the US-UK
relationship apart in international politics. And it is
because collaboration is so institutionalised, and basic
strategic thinking so closely aligned, that disagreements
on tactics can be discussed and either reconciled or sustained without wider political conflict.
In advance of the trip, British officials were emphasising that this is a relationship of stocks more than flows,
where shared strategic perspectives and levels of investment in each other range across a host of areas
from security through economy to culture. Yet three key areas spring to mind where the United States and
the United Kingdom share strategic goals but disagree over means: the global economy, intervention in
Afghanistan and Libya, and Islamic radicalisation.
As the financial crisis unfolded Gordon Brown’s coordination of a worldwide stimulus response was lauded in
the United States. Yet as saving the financial system has evolved into sustaining recovery, the coalition
government’s radical departure from Labour’s policies has created genuine differences over how to
approach the global economy. For Cameron, it’s all about cutting deficits, and doing so by cutting
government spending. For Obama, domestic stimulus was the key, and although mindful of deficits the
President places far greater weight on ensuring growth. Part of this results from domestic political contexts,
and the real difficulty the United States has in making any of its own spending cuts, but there is also a wider
sense in which the United States relies on the Europeans – and the British in particular – to make a
contribution to sustaining the US-led international order that has served them so well. The British
government’s decision to cut defense and slash Foreign Office spending did not go down well with an
Obama administration seeking to enable others to do more and shoulder less of the burden and profile of
leadership itself.
This context of cuts has percolated into more specific foreign policy engagements. On Afghanistan, whilst the
two nations share the same goal, the UK’s fixed date for troop withdrawals sits uncomfortably with a US
administration that although committed to drawdowns has recognised the necessity of linking that process to
the capacities of Afghanistan’s own forces. And whilst both nations recognise that settlement rather than a
clear ‘victory’ is the inevitable outcome in Afghanistan, the British have thus far been far more willing to
engage in direct negotiations with the Taliban; British irritation with the delays in Obama’s promised
‘diplomatic surge’ is palpable.
On Libya, Cameron’s hawkishness was backed by the White House, which was nonetheless adamant that
Europeans would take the lead. British officials were surprised to say the least when the United States did
just that, providing just some intelligence and background military support and thus far refusing to commit to
a frontline American role. Coming back to those spending cuts, the message from Washington is that those
who agitate for action must be prepared to back their words with capability, that grandstanding on the
bandwagon of American power will no longer suffice when the United States talks of ‘broad-based coalitions’
of the ‘international community’.
Third, there is a specific concern from the American side about British counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation policy. After Wikileaks cables written by senior US military officers at Guantanamo accused
Britain over the last twenty years of having become a centre of radicalisation and terrorist planning, and
senior state department officials openly referred to the capital as ‘Londonistan’, there has been tension
between the two intelligence communities. Whilst intelligence sharing is the most deeply embedded aspect of
the ‘special relationship’, with the CIA and SIS mounting joint operations and the NSA and GCHQ sharing
cyberintelligence as a matter of course, British officials have to date been defensive to American criticisms of
their methods, in which they tend to favour more lengthy monitoring in advance of any intervention than their
US counterparts. Cameron’s controversial speech on multiculturalism at the Munich Security Conference was
the beginnings of that effort, but he will have to provide substantive reassurances that Britain is willing and
able to address its issues with radicalisation.
One perennial issue has however been successfully placed on the sidelines of this visit. The UK’s ambivalent
relationship with Europe, manifest in the contrasting attitudes of the rank-and-file of the Conservative and
Liberal Democrat coalition partners, has barely merited a mention. Gone is talk of Britain as a transatlantic
bridge between the US and Europe, or the suggestion that the UK needed to choose: either the special
relationship, or the EU. In part this is the result of the Foreign Secretary’s emphasis on the role of foreign
policy in promoting trade and investment: by concentrating on building up economic relationships with
emerging markets, in particular India, China, and Latin America, the UK has created a new focus for its
diplomacy that is separate from its established ties.
Yet Europe, and the contribution it can make in international politics, will not be far from the thoughts of
policymakers. This is not a President that intends to return the United States to the rank and file. The US
retains both immense power and the will to use it, as shown by Obama’s ruthless approach towards Osama
bin Laden. Yet although the United States will continue to play the preeminent role in guaranteeing the
international order, it will increasingly seek to do so by authorising and supporting others rather than acting
alone. A hegemonic power yes, willing and able to define the agenda, but a leader that enables others to
pursue that agenda, rather than uncompromisingly attempting to impose it. In this Europe’s willingness and
ability to really contribute is key. Calling for a third great project of transatlanticism is not the same as
creating and sustaining one. To the British, and the Europeans, Obama will ask not what he can do for
Europe, but what Europe will help him do for the world.
This article first appeared on the International Affairs at LSE blog on 3 June.
